Evidence for Emulation in Chimpanzees in Social Settings Using the Floating Peanut Task by Tennie, Claudio et al.
Evidence for Emulation in Chimpanzees in Social Settings
Using the Floating Peanut Task
Claudio Tennie*, Josep Call, Michael Tomasello
Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany
Abstract
Background: It is still unclear which observational learning mechanisms underlie the transmission of difficult problem-
solving skills in chimpanzees. In particular, two different mechanisms have been proposed: imitation and emulation.
Previous studies have largely failed to control for social factors when these mechanisms were targeted.
Methods: In an attempt to resolve the existing discrepancies, we adopted the ‘floating peanut task’, in which subjects need
to spit water into a tube until it is sufficiently full for floating peanuts to be grasped. In a previous study only a few
chimpanzees were able to invent the necessary solution (and they either did so in their first trials or never). Here we
compared success levels in baseline tests with two experimental conditions that followed: 1) A full model condition to test
whether social demonstrations would be effective, and 2) A social emulation control condition, in which a human
experimenter poured water from a bottle into the tube, to test whether results information alone (present in both
experimental conditions) would also induce successes. Crucially, we controlled for social factors in both experimental
conditions. Both types of demonstrations significantly increased successful spitting, with no differences between
demonstration types. We also found that younger subjects were more likely to succeed than older ones. Our analysis
showed that mere order effects could not explain our results.
Conclusion: The full demonstration condition (which potentially offers additional information to observers, in the form of
actions), induced no more successes than the emulation condition. Hence, emulation learning could explain the success in
both conditions. This finding has broad implications for the interpretation of chimpanzee traditions, for which emulation
learning may perhaps suffice.
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Introduction
The cumulative nature of human culture appears to be unique
within the animal kingdom [1–5]. This qualityrequiresa high level of
copying fidelity to every stage involved; it has been suggested that
cumulative culture requires individuals to rely on imitation learning
as this leads to learning not only the products, but also the detailed
actions necessary to acquire a certain behaviour (i.e., the process
leading to the product [5]). Academics remain undecided as to
whether non-enculturated (i.e., untrained in any way) chimpanzees
learnsociallyin a comparableway to humans,with some arguing that
these chimpanzees engage in imitative learning (e.g. [6–8]), and
others remaining more sceptical (e.g. [4,5,9]). And it is these un-
enculturated chimpanzees which represent more closely the state of
wild living chimpanzees, since wild-living apes do not have the option
of human raising or training (thus, if ecological validity is sought, non-
enculturated chimpanzees should be studied). The question of
whether or not such chimpanzees can socially learn from others
using imitation remains an important debate as it may shed light on
what sets human culture apart from other types of cultures in non-
human species [4,5,9].
Imitation is considered a complex form of social learning that
involves copying the demonstrator’s bodily actions [10–12]. An
alternative form of social learning hypothesized to underlie ape
traditions is emulation learning ([13], see also [14]). When
emulation takes place, the observer ‘‘picks up’’ on changes in
the environment that result from the demonstrator’s actions, hence
the term ‘‘results copying’’ may also be used to describe emulation
learning [10,11]. These results might be perceived and computed
in different ways, ranging from so-called ‘‘object-movement re-
enactment’’ [15] to insight learning (for a general overview see
[16]). An emulator ignores the actions of the demonstrator, and
focuses primarily (if not solely) on the changes in the environment.
As a consequence, if anything is copied following a demonstration,
it will be the results, but not the actions involved.
It is, however, possible that observers are not completely blind
to actions insofar as these actions can transmit information about
the demonstrator’s goals. Observers may therefore learn some-
thing about the demonstrator’s goals based on the observed
actions and in combination with what they understand about the
observed results, determine how to achieve the same results (or, if
the demonstration failed, they may achieve the opposite result
instead; see [17]). The specific details of the actions would however
still be lost since focus would be placed on the goals of the
demonstrator and not on the actions themselves. Because these
goals typically (though not always) revolve around changes in the
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cases, the resulting learning type may represent a mixture of goal
copying and results copying (named differently by different
researchers; e.g., ‘‘goal emulation’’–with emphasis on the goal
copying part [18], but see also [10]; ‘‘teleological emulation’’–
which weighs both learning mechanisms equally [19]).
Empirically, it has proven difficult to separate the effects of
actions and results because frequently the two are presented
simultaneously (and this is especially problematic if both are
somewhat redundant; e.g., a finger pressing a recessed button; see
also [20]). For example, Whiten et al. claimed chimpanzees
imitated the actions performed by demonstrators during a so-
called two-action foraging task [21]. The apparatus in their study
had a block obstructing a food chute, which could be moved to
release a piece of food by either lifting or pushing the block. In one
experimental group, a chimpanzee demonstrator lifted the block
by levering an attached bar with a stick, and in another
experimental group, another demonstrator used the same stick
to push through a hole at the block itself (two different
demonstrations–hence two-action task). The concern with defining
this as imitation, is that if a demonstrator pokes a stick into a hole
and the accompanying results (possibly together with the goal of
inserting a stick) are copied by an observer, then the observer’s
behaviour will appear as if they had also copied the underlying
actions (the ‘‘human eye’’ seems prone to this type of error).
Because of the redundant actions, this experimental design does
not rule out emulation as the underlying learning force (which is
why it would be more precise to call this method the ‘‘two-actions/
two-results task’’). This kind of methodological issue is not
unavoidable, as evidenced by studies on birds (e.g. [22]), dogs
[23] and marmosets [24] which overcame these problems by
introducing action style components into demonstrations. For
great apes, however, most observational learning studies which
found copying are unable to distinguish between imitation and
emulation learning, because it is unclear exactly what element has
been copied (e.g. [21,25–27]). To complicate matters, some such
studies often add further potential information types, such as local
or stimulus enhancement (e.g. [21,28]), which again increase the
number of possible underlying learning mechanisms (e.g., the two
locations in [21]). In addition to the typical confound of mixing
action with results information (see above), two-action tasks often
involve the introduction of relatively trivial differences between
groups (e.g., move a lever to the left or right), which can hardly be
regarded as a full blown culture even if the respective methods
spread (e.g. [12,29]). If such traditions are induced they can at best
be described as mere ‘‘founder effects’’ of binary types of
information/traditions (compare [5]), which (even though impor-
tant in their own rights) may not get at the heart of the question of
whether ape traditions have much in common with human
culture. Therefore, in an attempt to answer these questions, less
trivial tasks should be used (compare also [17]).
In order to truly investigate whether great apes copy actions
spontaneously, a study needs to do one of three things: 1)
demonstrate pure actions without any results information at all
(‘‘esture copying studies’’ see [30]); 2) demonstrate pure results
without any action information at all (‘‘host control studies’’ see
[12,29,31]) or 3) decouple actions and results (this study). In the
latter case, (non-redundant) demonstrated actions Y would lead to
the result X (e.g., an approach to a hole walking on one’s hands
and the insertion of the stick using the foot). Due to them being
decoupled from the resulting effect, the peculiar actions Y would
later only materialize in the observers if they were indeed copying
actions. This would then be a direct test of action copying. The
logical counter-variant of such studies–used here–may directly test
for emulation learning instead. Here, the demonstrator demon-
strates the action Y, but, crucially, the setup is such that observers
can only perform an unobserved action Z (because action Y is
blocked/unavailable to observers). Again, both actions do lead to
the same result (X). Here, if observers produce action Z, then
action copying cannot have been responsible–because the
observers never have seen action Z being demonstrated. Thus,
the observers must have used different types of learning (i.e.,
emulation learning: reproducing the same result–by necessarily re-
inventing an unseen action).
There is only one published study to date that uses the ‘‘esture
copying’’method in non-enculturated chimpanzees (i.e., to dem-
onstrate pure actions without results). In this study, chimpanzees
failed to copy a novel action (a ‘‘begging gesture’’ from a
conspecific model despite potentially high levels of rewards [30].
Although these findings provided no evidence that chimpanzees
copy actions spontaneously in problem solving tasks, subsequent
ghost control studies have produced a more ambiguous picture.
Three ghost control studies with chimpanzees have now been
published, all using conspecific-demonstrator conditions as
comparisons (i.e. [12,29,31]). In one study, observers showed no
evidence of observational learning regardless of the condition [12].
In a different study, chimpanzees learned in the full-demonstration
condition, but did not learn in the ghost condition [31]. However,
in the third study, there was evidence for observational learning in
both conditions (i.e., evidence also for emulation in the ghost
condition), but with stronger observational learning in the full
demonstration condition [29]. In sum, non-enculturated chim-
panzees (henceforth simply chimpanzees) do not seem to copy
pure actions without results information [30]–but they also seem
to be reluctant to copy pure results (see above). The underlying
reason might be that a third factor may be responsible for these
discrepant findings, and we believe this factor could be social.
In reviewing the ghost condition literature in chimpanzees, we
noticed that these studies systematically differed with respect to
social factors, which might explain their conflicting findings.
Besides actions and results, there is a third–social-type of
information that observers may learn about and copy during
demonstrations: goal information [10,11]. Goal information
describes the state of the world that the demonstrator tries to
achieve. Ghost control studies typically lack such goal information
(one cannot gather goals from ‘ghosts’). Recent studies suggest that
chimpanzees may be able to perceive more about goals than was
previously thought [32,33]. In the light of such recent findings, it is
conceivable that the absence of this type of information may prove
detrimental to the observational learning process for chimpanzees,
and if that is the case, it is to be expected that chimpanzees’ ability
to copy will be negatively affected in ghost conditions. In addition
to the potential lack of goal information, previous ghost condition
studies have also lacked social presence during the demonstration
phase. Yet, having a conspecific present during ghost demonstra-
tions may enhance learning by way of social support [34]. Social
ghost conditions may act as general motivation enhancers; the
only ape study to provide evidence for emulation in a ghost
condition found copying only in its social ghost condition (i.e.,
‘‘enhanced ghost condition’’ [29]). Finally, in those cases where a
conspecific is present during demonstrations, it may matter
whether there is a separation between observer and demonstrator.
For example, in Tennie et al., the demonstrator and observer were
separated by a glass/mesh during full model demonstrations,
which may have led to this study’s negative finding [12]. In both
Hopper et al. studies, there was no conspecific present in the ghost
condition, and no copying was found there [29,31]. However, in
the Hopper et al. ‘‘enhanced’’ ghost condition (i.e., ‘‘ocial’’ghost
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observer (Lydia Hopper, pers. comm.), and it was here that clear
evidence for emulation was found in chimpanzees. The reason
that little evidence of emulation (i.e., only in the 1st trial) was
found even in this ‘‘nhanced’’condition might also be simply
because in this condition the demonstrators did not directly
interact with the apparatus, and thus probably did not transmit
any goal information. To summarize, it is conceivable that these
three social factors play a role in emulation learning in
chimpanzees: 1) goal information, 2) the presence of a conspecific
during demonstrations, 3) if a conspecific is present, physical
proximity between conspecific and observer.
In the present study, we tried to include all of these social factors
in our demonstration phases. We also aimed to avoid the potential
pitfalls of studies that employ the ‘‘two-action task’’ procedure,
especially the problem of triviality of task (e.g. [21]). When using
less trivial tasks, one can use two different approaches, the first of
which would be to use tasks incapable of being solved by
individual chimpanzees (i.e., where low-fidelity learning mecha-
nisms alone do not help). These studies are interesting because
they can uncover cases of cumulative culture. Currently, only one
such study has been conducted, and the four species of great apes
tested failed to show evidence of such copying [5]. A second
approach would be to use tasks in which most, but not all,
chimpanzees fail during baseline trials–an approach chosen for
this study. In these experiments one can use the few successful
subjects as ‘‘natural demonstrators’’ since they learned the
technique during baseline trials and do not need to be trained
further (it should be noted that such a practice may introduce a
bias against good inventors. However, this is less problematic as
long as several experimental conditions are compared with each
other. Here each condition then tests apes with comparable
performances). The added benefit of this situation is that the
demonstrated technique is potentially more representative of a real
ape tradition, and hence more ecologically valid (see [5]; see also
discussion). Here, we tested chimpanzee subjects in such a difficult
(but not impossible) problem solving task (‘‘floating peanut task’’;
see [35,36]). This task consists of a Plexiglas tube mounted
vertically to the mesh of a cage, with only the top end open.
Shelled peanuts are placed inside the tube resting at the closed
bottom. The peanut could not be extracted from the top unless
subjects added water to the tube thus causing the peanut to float
high enough so that it could then be extracted. Prior to our study,
Hanus et al. tested 25 chimpanzees using this task on Ngamba
Island, Uganda; as well as 19 chimpanzees at the WKPRC,
Leipzig, Germany (total n=44, [36]). Overall, in Hanus et al. ’s
study, only 7 subjects were successful, and all of these invented the
solution either in their first or their second trial. Thus, in Hanus et
al. ’s study, subjects either learned early on in the trials or never at
all, despite the fact that all subjects received four to eight trials.
We adapted the Hanus et al. study into a social learning
experiment in order to ascertain whether chimpanzees are best
described as emulators or imitators. All subjects were first tested in
a baseline period, in which no previous information was provided
to subjects (partly data from Hanus et al. and partly novel baseline
trials established by us). Subjects then entered one of two
experimental conditions: the full demonstration condition (pro-
viding information about actions, goals and results), or the
emulation condition (‘‘ater bottle’’, providing only information
about results and goals). In the full demonstration condition
subjects witnessed a model pouring water from the mouth to the
tube in order to get access to the peanut. In the emulation
condition, subjects were shown how to solve the task by pouring
water from a bottle into the tube. Thus, observers were required to
produce the alternative, unobserved action (spitting water into the
tube) in order to achieve the demonstrated result (i.e., making the
peanut float up to the top with water).
By using these three conditions, we set out to disentangle the
contributions of different learning processes potentially involved in
the floating peanut task–as a model for behavioural traditions in
chimpanzees in the field (e.g. [5,37]). Comparison of the subjects’
performances allowed us to do the following: a) measure the
probability of innovation in these subjects over trials as a potential
general means of solving the problem–and the rate of innovation was
determined by baseline performance, b) measure the effects of
different demonstration types compared to baseline performance (i.e.,
whether one or both demonstration types led to more solutions than
had occurred during baseline; in other words, whether observational
learning could help elicit the behaviour), c) determine the most
plausible underlying learning mechanism (imitation or emulation) by
comparing the effects of the two demonstration conditions. The
underlying logic was that one type of demonstration (the full model;
actions, goals and results) would only constitute an advantage if
subjects were engaging in action copying (imitation) in order to learn
the solutions. However, if no difference between the demonstration
conditions could be found the most parsimonious explanation would
be that subjects had made use of the same type of information in both
conditions (i.e., results information (possibly spurred by goal
information)–since this was the only type of information that was
present in both experimental conditions).
Methods
Ethics statement
All the presented studies were non-invasive and strictly adhered
to the legal requirements of the countries in which they were
conducted. For Leipzig (Germany), animal husbandry and
research complied with the ‘‘EAZA Minimum Standards for the
Accommodation and Care of Animals in Zoos and Aquaria’’ and
the ‘‘WAZA Ethical Guidelines for the Conduct of Research on
Animals by Zoos and Aquariums’’ respectively. For Ngamba
Island (Uganda) animal husbandry and research complied with the
‘‘PASA Primate Veterinary Healthcare Manual’’ and the
‘‘Chimpanzee Sanctuary & Wildlife Conservation Trust Policy’’.
In Leipzig, the apes were housed in semi-natural indoor (overall
533 m
2 chimpanzee group ‘‘A’’; overall 340 m
2 chimpanzee
group ‘‘B’’) and outdoor (4000 m
2 chimpanzee group ‘‘A’’;
1400 m
2 chimpanzee group ‘‘B’’) enclosures with regular feedings,
enrichment and water ad lib. Subjects voluntarily participated in
the study and were neither food nor water deprived.
In Ngamba, the apes were allowed to roam freely on the 40 ha
island during the day and spent the night in seven interconnected
sleeping rooms (overall 140 m
2) with regular feedings and water ad
lib. Subjects voluntarily participated in the study and were neither
food nor water deprived.
Subjects
Thirty-two socially-housed chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) partic-
ipated in this study. There were eleven males and 21 females,
ranging in age between five and 31 years. Twenty-three
chimpanzees were housed at the Ngamba Island Chimpanzee
Sanctuary (http://www.ngambaisland.org), Uganda and ten were
housed at the Wolfgang Ko ¨hler Primate Research Center in
Leipzig Zoo (http://wkprc.eva.mpg.de), Germany (Table 1). None
of the subjects had ever solved this task either because they had
never been tested (n=3, all in Ngamba) or having been tested in a
previous study on non-social problem-solving [36], they had failed
to solve it. Subjects could choose to stop participating at any time
Emulation in Chimpanzees
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criterion. After participating, subjects were then released back into
their home enclosures.
Three additional chimpanzees (two from Ngamba: Yoyo,
Umutama and one from Leipzig: Frodo) who had learned to solve
the task in a previous study were used during the demonstration
conditions. All three individuals were dominant over their partners
during the demonstration conditions. This was done to insure that the
partners would watch but not interfere with the demonstrations-
something that fortunately never happened during the study.
Materials
A vertically-oriented Plexiglas tube (25 cm long; 5 cm outward
diameter and 5 mm thick) closed at the bottom was securely
fastened to the caging. One peanut pod (containing two peanuts)
was dropped inside the tube so that it rested at its bottom outside
of the subject’s reach. Prior to testing it was ensured that no tools
were available in the cage. A drinker situated within 1 m from the
tube (with the spigot at the same height as the tube opening)
provided the water source. Such a drinker was installed prior to
the test and it was not available outside of the testing situation
(such ‘‘new drinkers’’may protect against functional fixedness
potentially attached to ‘‘old drinkers’’ see [36]).
Procedure
Subjects received two conditions: one baseline condition and
one of the two experimental conditions. Prior to receiving one of
the experimental conditions, all subjects had received the baseline
condition to assess whether subjects were able to solve the task
individually. However, subjects differed both in the number of
baseline trials that they received, ranging from 2 to 10 (see Table 1)
and the source of those trials. In particular, some subjects
Table 1. Overview of number of trials for baseline experience (newly installed drinker trials only) and type of experimental
condition.
Subject Sex Housing Rearing history Baseline Hanus et al. Baseline this study
Experimental
condition
Alex M WKPRC Hand 0 4 Water bottle
Annett F WKPRC Hand 0 4 Water bottle
Fraukje F WKPRC Hand 0 4 Full demonstration
Gertruida F WKPRC Mother 0 4 Water bottle
Patrick M WKPRC Mother 0 4 Full demonstration
Pia F WKPRC Mother 0 4 Full demonstration
Sandra F WKPRC Mother 0 4 Water bottle
Swela F WKPRC Mother 0 4 Full demonstration
Unyoro M WKPRC Mother 0 4 Water bottle
Asega M NICS Mother/Hand 8 2 Water bottle
Bahati F NICS Mother/Hand 4 0 Full demonstration
Baluku M NICS Mother/Hand 4 0 Water bottle
Becky F NICS Mother/Hand 8 2 None
Bwambale M NICS Mother/Hand 6 0 Full demonstration
Connie F NICS Mother/Hand 8 0 Water bottle
Ikuru F NICS Mother/Hand 8 0 Full demonstration
Indi M NICS Mother/Hand 8 2 Full demonstration
Kalema M NICS Mother/Hand 8 0 Water bottle
Kazahukire F NICS Mother/Hand 0 2 Full demonstration
Kidogo F NICS Mother/Hand 4 2 None
Kisembo M NICS Mother/Hand 7 0 Full demonstration
Nakuu F NICS Mother/Hand 4 0 Full demonstration
Namukiza F NICS Mother/Hand 4 0 Full demonstration
Nani F NICS Mother/Hand 8 0 Water bottle
Natasha F NICS Mother/Hand 8 0 Water bottle
Ndyakira F NICS Mother/Hand 0 2 Water bottle
Nkumwa F NICS Mother/Hand 8 2 Water bottle
Pasa F NICS Mother/Hand 8 0 Water bottle
Sally F NICS Mother/Hand 8 2 None
Sunday M NICS Mother/Hand 4 2 None
Umugenzi M NICS Mother/Hand 0 2 Full demonstration
F=female, M=male; WKPRC=Wolfgang Ko ¨hler Primate Research Center; NICS=Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary, Uganda. Taken (and extended) from [36].
Included subjects only.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010544.t001
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trials from the Hanus et al. study (n=12, see [36]), some only from
the current study (n=12), and some from both studies (n=7). The
reason we conducted our own baseline was to ensure that our
baseline and the Hanus et al. ’ baseline produced comparable
results. We found no differences between the subjects tested with
the Hanus et al. baseline and those tested in the current study.
Therefore, we pooled all the subjects into the same analysis. The
different number of trials was an important feature of our design to
be able to assess order effects (see below). Upon completing
baseline trials, all subjects except four (due to time constraints)
were distributed into two groups matched as closely as possible for
age, sex and number of previous trials and received one of the two
experimental conditions. Thirteen subjects were placed in the full
demonstration condition and 14 subjects were placed in the water
bottle condition. Next we describe the baseline and the two
experimental conditions.
Baseline (total N=31). Subjects were presented with the
peanut at the bottom of the tube and allowed to attempt to acquire
the peanut. The differences with our own baseline trials and those
of Hanus et al. ’s study were as follows: we let subjects first observe
the general setup from an adjacent room (in order to further
control for the demonstration/waiting times of our two
experimental conditions). Thus, after having observed E place
the nuts in the tube, and prior to each trial, subjects spent five
minutes in the cage next to the experimental cage (in full view of
the tube). Subjects received a maximum of two trials (both on one
day) and were alone during trials (except for E, who was present).
In this condition, the only way to solve this task was to invent the
solution spontaneously.
Full model condition (N=13). This condition was the same
as our own baseline (see above) except that prior to their first test
trial, subjects witnessed four to six demonstrations of the solution
(from the initial water spitting until their partner acquired the
peanut), and two further demonstrations before their second trial
(see Fig. 1a for the general setup). Subjects received a maximum of
two trials, depending on their performance (see below). A
conspecific demonstrated the solution (spitting multiple times
inside the tube in the process) while the subject stayed in the same
cage, which means that she could freely approach and closely
observe the demonstrator. Before their first trial, observers were
required to have witnessed at least two spits into the tube. If they
had seen these two spits within four demonstrations (live coded by
E: each time subjects were required to face towards the
demonstration, open-eyed and with an unobstructed line of
sight), they were given their first trial, if not, they were given
two more demonstrations. If observers still had not seen the
required two spits, they were excluded from the study (though this
situation never arose). In this condition, subjects could invent the
solution spontaneously, they could imitate the actions of water
spitting (action copying: imitation), or they could only copy the
results of the demonstrator’s actions.
Water bottle condition (N=14). This condition was
identical to the full model condition (including the number of
solutions witnessed) except for the following differences. A
solution-naı ¨ve, but dominant conspecific (‘‘stooge’’ demonstrator)
was used as a social partner for the subject. E enacted an
alternative solution to water-spitting by pouring into the tube the
necessary amount of water from a bottle from outside the cage
(Fig. 1b). In order to fill the tube to the required level, E poured
three ‘glugs’ from the bottle of water. If the observer was
constantly watching E, then there was approximately two seconds
between each glug. However, if the observer was not watching,
then E paused the pouring until the observer was watching, then
continued to pour. Once the peanut reached the top of the tube,
the ‘stooge’ demonstrator invariably took the peanut, thus being
comparable to the outcome of the full demonstration condition. In
this condition, the subject was able to witness the results producing
the solution (i.e., water added to the tube will raise the water level
which will raise the nuts to within reach) but without any actions
that the subject could use to solve the task. Subjects in this
condition thus had two possible routes to solutions: they could
invent the solutions spontaneously, or they could emulate (but not
imitate–since they never saw the spitting action).
All trials were terminated after ten minutes unless subjects were
still attempting to get the peanut after this period has elapsed. In
such case, trials could be extended for a maximum of two
additional periods of five minutes so that the maximum length of a
trial could be 20 minutes (ten plus five plus five). Trials were also
terminated once the subject retrieved the reward. In the event of a
success, the subject was not tested again.
Data Scoring and Analysis
All trials were videotaped using a wide-angle camera. E scored live
whether or not a subject was successful in retrieving the nuts in a
given trial (i.e., general success was our main dependent measure).
Additionally, we scored from the videotapes the following drinker-
and tube-related behaviours: number of times water was collected
from the drinker and number of times the subject spat into the tube.
In order to assess inter-observer reliability for these tube- and drinker-
related behaviour a different coder (C. Tennie) coded 20% of trials
(randomly selected from all experimental trials, as well as from the
baseline trials that were performed solely for this study). Inter-
observer reliability was very high for both measurements (Pearson’s:
number of times water was collected: r=0.972; number of times spat
intotube:r=0.982).Toassessinter-observerreliabilityforsuccessesa
naı ¨vecoderalsocodedgeneralsuccessesfromvideotapeforrandomly
chosen trials (60% of all trials). Reliability was nearly perfect (with
only one mismatch in total).
We analyzed our dependent measure, success to get the peanut,
using a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM; [38]) with binomial
error structure and logit link function calculated using the package
lme4 [39] for R [40]. As fixed effects we included the factor
‘condition’ and the covariate ‘trial number’ into the model. Since the
number of successes in the dataset was small, the assumptions of this
procedure were likely to have been violated, devaluing the validity of
the p-values thus derived. Hence we established correct significances
based on a permutation test. For this we randomized the outcomes of
trialswithinsubjects and then ran a GLMM for the randomized data.
We repeated this procedure 1000 times and each time derived the
estimated coefficient of an effect (condition or trial). Finally we
estimated the p-value for an effect by determining the proportion of
permutations that revealed an absolute coefficient being at least as
large as that of the original data.
GLMM offered us two key advantages over other statistical
techniques. First, it allowed us to incorporate a ‘‘subjects’’ factor as
a random effect in order to control for observations that are
replicated [41]. Second, since our baseline always preceded the
experimental conditions, this could potentially create an order of
administration confound. The inclusion of the covariate ‘trial
number’ in the model allowed us to control for this aspect (i.e.:
when trial/order effects were tested, then condition was controlled
for and vice versa). Thus order/trial effects, if they existed for an
experimental condition, would not explain a general effect of
condition if it were found.
We used the exact Mann-Whitney-U test to analyze whether
there were differences between the two experimental conditions.
To do so, we calculated the subjects’ success ratios (success divided
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represent drinkers. Chimpanzees on the left: subjects. Chimpanzees on the right: demonstrator or stooge (depending on condition). Please note that,
for clarity reasons, most bars of the caging have been omitted from the drawing.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010544.g001
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the ratios calculated for each demonstration condition. Elsewhere,
wherever we used either a Mann-Whitney-U test or a Wilcoxon
test we used 1
st trial data only (since not every subject had a 2
nd
trial). Obviously, this rule did not apply when we compared
behaviour between the two trials.
To compare drinker- and tube-related behaviour between
baseline and experimental conditions, we used our baseline data
derived from Ngamba subjects only. Since we could not perform a
meaningful Wilcoxon test on just the resulting six subjects who
were in both the baseline and the experimental conditions, we ran
a Mann-Whitney-U test comparing subjects in the baseline
condition with others in the experimental conditions. This
procedure was straightforward for those subjects who only were
in one condition, but for those subjects who had been in both
conditions (i.e., baseline condition and experimental condition) we
only used data from their baseline condition (we did so since the
sample size of the baseline condition was smaller than the sample
size of the experimental condition).
Results
Overall, eight subjects were successful across the experimental
conditions (five in the full model condition and three in the water
bottle condition). Both experimental conditions, when compared
to baseline, showed significantly more successes after demonstra-
tions (Full model condition; permutation test: p=0.002; Water
bottle condition; permutation test: p=0.015). We found no
additional effects of trials when comparing baseline with both
experimental conditions pooled (Effect of exp. condition; permu-
tation test: p=0.001; Trial effect; permutation test: p=0.957),
When tested alone, the full model condition, but not the water
bottle condition, showed additionally an effect of trial (Full model
condition; permutation test: p=0.034; Water bottle condition;
permutation test: p=1.00). Thus, both types of experimental
demonstration resulted in more successes than the baseline
condition, which means that demonstrations did indeed have a
positive effect and thus offered an advantage over individual
innovation. While differing in terms of success in retrieving the
peanut, baseline subjects did not differ from experimental subjects
in tube- and drinker-related behaviour (exact Mann Whitney U
tests: number of water retrievals: U=53, NBL=10, NEXP=12,
p=0.673; number of spits into the tube: U=39.5, NBL=10,
NEXP=12, p=0.148).
There were no significant differences between experimental
conditions in the success to retrieve the peanut (exact Mann Whitney
Ut e s t ,U = 7 8 ,N full demo=13, N waterbottle=14, p=0.475) or the
number of subjects who spat into the tube (Fisher’s test; p=0.706;
seven and six subjects in the full model and the water bottle
conditions, respectively), Furthermore, subjects in both experimental
conditions did not differ in general tube-and drinker-related
behaviour (exact Mann Whitney U tests: number of water gatherings
U=62.5,N full demo=13,N waterbottle=14, p=0.170; number of spits
into tube: U=79, Nfull demo=13,N waterbottle=14, p=0.547).
Next we pooled the data from both experimental conditions to
explore what might distinguish successful from unsuccessful
subjects. Perhaps successful subjects were more motivated to solve
the task. If so it would be expected that successful subjects simply
tried longer to solve the task than did unsuccessful subjects.
Contrary to this idea, we found that successful subjects had shorter
trials than unsuccessful subjects (exact Mann Whitney U test,
U=0, NSuccess=6, N NoSuccess=21, p=,0.001). Unsuccessful
subjects became less focused on the task in their second trial as
evidenced by the fact that they retrieved water less often in their
second trial than in their first trial (Wilcoxon; T
+=113.5; n=16;
p=0.016). Additionally, we found that successful subjects were
younger than unsuccessful subjects (exact Mann Whitney U test:
U=21, NNoSuccess=21, NSuccess=6, p=0.011; median age (years):
successful=7, unsuccessful=10).
Finally, we checked whether there might have been a difference
between the Ngamba and Leipzig subjects concerning drinker-
and tube-related behaviour. We detected no such differences
(exact Mann Whitney U tests: number of water gatherings: U=45,
NNgamba=18, NLeipzig=9, p=0.064; number of spits into tube:
U=54, NNgamba=18, NLeipzig=9, p=0.139).
Discussion
In stark contrast to baseline performances, both experimental
conditions elicited successes in some observers–with no difference
between the two experimental conditions. Thus, demonstrations of
three simultaneous information types (i.e., actions, goals and
results: full demonstration condition) offered no advantage over
demonstrations of two information types (i.e., results and goal
information only: water bottle condition). The most parsimonious
explanation is that the underlying learning mechanism was
emulation learning (results copying; here possibly spurred by goal
information) in both experimental conditions–since apparently
action information offered no advantage to observers. We thus
conclude that unsuccessful chimpanzees can be observationally
induced to solve the floating peanut task mainly on their own:
when trying to arrive at the observed result, they were able to fill in
the (unseen) action information themselves.
While this one study alone cannot rule out (spontaneous) action
copying in chimpanzees (though see also [30]), our results show
that emulation is a viable mechanism for acquiring target
behaviour under social circumstances–that is, if presented together
with goal information. The idea that some form of emulation
could account for tradition-building in chimpanzees is an
explanation that is consistent with the ape social learning literature
in general ([4,5,9,12,42,43] but for a different view see [8]) and
with more recent experimental evidence for group-specific
traditions forming in monkey species that lack complex imitating
abilities [44]. At the moment, the most parsimonious explanation
seems to be that copying results and goals (rather than copying of
actions) could underlie ape traditions. When social support, spatial
separation and goal information are controlled for, chimpanzees
showed evidence for copying (of results, i.e., emulation), and with
no difference in performance to a full demonstration condition.
This finding of copying is in contrast to earlier studies that sought
to detect emulation learning in chimpanzees and which presented
results information while lacking social controls (i.e. [12,29,31]).
Importantly, no evidence for copying was found in a study that
included these social factors, but which presented no results
information at all (‘‘pure’’ action copying study [30]). It is also
worth noting that chimpanzees often do not follow actions
demonstrated to them when these same actions are also available
to them (e.g. [5,12])–and instead prefer to act independently from
demonstrations, which is further evidence that emulation learning
is important for them (see also an example for this in keas: [45]).
Our results are not due to mere stimulus or local enhancement
[46,47] to the drinkers in the full model condition. This
information was not necessary, since there was no difference
between successes (or indeed any drinker- or tube-related
behaviour) elicited by both experimental conditions, despite the
fact that there was no drinker enhancement in the water bottle
condition (the water bottles were instead filled out of the observer’s
sight). One might argue that observers would have copied even in
Emulation in Chimpanzees
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 May 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 5 | e10544cases where water was merely present to some degree in the tube
(i.e., either a semi-filled tube, or a fully filled tube)–without having
seen the filling of the tube (so called ‘‘end-state conditions’’ [17]).
However, we do not think that subjects would have copied in such
a stationary condition, for the following reasons: Baseline subjects
did not differ from experimental subjects in general drinker- and
tube-related behaviour, suggesting that indeed something extra–
and crucial for success–has been transmitted by both demonstra-
tion types. Also, such semi-end-state conditions (semi-filled tubes at
start of trial) were already conducted as part of the problem solving
study of Hanus et al. and they found no difference between their
fully dry (like in our baseline) and semi-filled condition [36]. In
contrast, our dynamic (and social) emulation condition led to
successes in subjects who had proven unsuccessful before–which
suggests that dynamic physics matter more to chimpanzees than
do at least semi-end-states (at least for difficult tasks; for an easier
task in chimpanzees with opposite findings see [17]). Or else it may
suggest that goal information needs to be additionally present,
since this type of information was missing in Hanus et al. [36].
However, the possibility remains that a special end-state
condition–a fully filled tube–would be as effective as our emulation
condition. Future studies will be needed to address this possibility.
Based on the literature, we believe the following additional
factors were ultimately responsible for our finding that chimpan-
zees are able to invent unseen actions for solutions that they can
potentially invent on their own (as evidenced by some successful
subjects in Hanus et al. [36]). As hypothesized in the introduction,
it is likely to be social factors that lead to clearer evidence for
emulation rather than (somewhat non-naturalistic) ghost controls.
We aimed to provide observers with as much social information as
possible, in order to induce their natural tendency to emulate, and
it seems that we have succeeded. What we cannot do, however, is
determine which of these three social factors was the most relevant
(or whether there was an interaction between them). Chimpanzees
in social learning experiments might require only one or else
several of the following: goal information, social support and/or
non-separation of subjects from observers. Should future studies
identify goal information as being strictly necessary for chimpan-
zees to induce emulation then the learning mechanism itself would
require renaming (e.g., teleological emulation: [19]; Else, using the
simplified terminology of Call & Carpenter one may speak of
‘‘goal and results copying’’ [10]).
Due to the general ecological validity of our study (in terms of
social factors, goal information, conspecific demonstrators [48], as
well as using a difficult task), and in light of a previous study that
failed to detect action copying in chimpanzees when only action
copying would have led to success [30], our finding supports the
recent hypothesis that emulation learning via re-invention could,
at least in principle, underlie many, most, or all socially learnt
behaviours in wild chimpanzees [5]. Once one subject has found
the required solution, it will be considerably easier for others who
observe her to derive at the (same) solution themselves (as shown in
this study). In accordance with this view, there seems to be no
behavioural tradition in chimpanzees (or any great ape-) which
could not be invented by a single (perhaps specially gifted, or
perhaps especially ‘‘lucky’’ or motivated) individual–and then
spread by way of emulation learning (possibly helped by
enhancement effects). It is apparently unnecessary for actions to
be copied during such a process–emulation suffices. It is true that
not all observers in our study acquired the target behaviour (i.e.
successful behaviour), suggesting that additional factors might be
necessary before a behaviour appears on a population-wide scale
(e.g. more demonstrations or equal levels of motivation etc.; but
see also below for a hypothesis based on age-effects).
By emulation, observers in effect ‘‘re-invent’’ a solution once
they have witnessed it–an effect best described as ‘‘catalystic’’,
rather than as ‘‘transmissive’’ (i.e., a domino-like effect). This
would mean that great apes like chimpanzees can only learn what
they could, in principle, also invent on their own–at least given the
right individual circumstances (i.e., enough motivation, access to
all necessary material, focus on the right objects, reduced
neophobia, social support etc.). The sheer number of these
interacting factors ensures that, overall, such inventions (and re-
inventions) must be regarded as a probabilistic process, and so,
while the appearance of certain behaviours in a given single
chimpanzee can still have a low baseline probability, the fact
remains that the task could potentially be learned in its entirety
without the help of observational learning at all (example of such
‘‘atent solutions’’include: chimpanzee nutcracking (see one subject
in the baseline of a recent study [49], which may have invented
this solution spontaneously); gorilla nettle feeding: [42,43];
chimpanzee leaf swallowing: [50]; chimpanzee termite fishing:
[51]; capuchin nut-cracking: [52]). During the spread of the
behaviour, the necessary actions then are generated from within
each observer anew and independently–and thus actions not
copied (and, crucially, they do not need to be copied).
This view has implications for the general limits of ape traditions. If
this hypothesis [5] proves correct, then ape traditions consist entirely
of ‘‘atent solutions’’ the scope of which is basically determined by the
limits of the emulative capacities of the species (in other words: by the
underlying problem solving skills–developed via natural selection).
Additionally, many other factors likely play a role in the realization of
traditions (e.g. motivational differences between populations due to
prior food choices). In concert, these factors may lead to the observed
‘‘patchy pattern’’ of traditions across living populations of chimpan-
zees (e.g., they lead to different ‘‘atent solution’’mixtures in different
populations, which explains the mosaic picture of chimpanzee
traditions described by Whiten et al. [37]–for which human like
imitative abilities are usually claimed as the underlying reason).
Our findings confirm an earlier observational learning study
[53] that described a similar age effect in emulation in
chimpanzees–and that also used a difficult, but not impossible,
task [compare also 5]. Noting that the age of successful learners (4–
6 years) coincided with the ‘‘earliest tool-use behaviours in the
wild’’ Tomasello et al. [53] introduced a ‘‘critical time period’’
hypothesis. Thus, the reason why most (or all) chimpanzees in a
given wild population show skill in certain tool-‘‘traditions’’–in
contrast to our and others’ [53] more partial findings–might be
that, earlier, these chimpanzees were able to learn during their
critical time period. If true, this hypothesis would explain why not
all subjects in our and the other [53] study became successful after
demonstrations. Once subjects have become too old they might
cease to be able (or to be motivated) to emulate in such situations.
Acknowledgments
We thank Nathan Pyne Carter, Marietta Dindo, Heinz Gretscher, Daniel
Hanus, Alicia Melis, Natacha Mendes, Nadja Miosga, Roger Mundry,
Raik Pieszek, Yvonne Rekers and the anonymous referees. We thank
Leonard Erlbruch for his drawings. We also thank the Max Planck Society;
Leipzig Zoo and CSWCT (Uganda)–as well as all animal keepers. We are
very thankful to UNCST (Ugandan National Council for Science and
Technology) and UWA (Ugandan Wildlife Authorities) for allowing us to
conduct our research at Ngamba Island.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: CT JC MT. Performed the
experiments: CT. Analyzed the data: CT. Contributed reagents/
materials/analysis tools: CT. Wrote the paper: CT JC.
Emulation in Chimpanzees
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 May 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 5 | e10544References
1. Tomasello M (1999) The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press. vi, 248 p.
2. Richerson PJ, Boyd R (2005) Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed
Human Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 342 p.
3. Caldwell CA, Millen AE (2008) Studying Cumulative Cultural Evolution in the
Laboratory. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of
London B Biological Sciences 363: 3529–3539.
4. Galef BG, Jr. (2009) Culture in Animals? In: Laland KN, Galef BG, Jr., eds. The
Question of Animal Culture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp
222–246.
5. Tennie C, Call J, Tomasello M (2009) Ratcheting Up the Ratchet: On the
Evolution of Cumulative Culture. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society of London B Biological Sciences 364: 2405–2415.
6. Horner V, Whiten A (2005) Causal Knowledge and Imitation/Emulation
Switching in Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and Children (Homo sapiens). Animal
Cognition 8: 164–181.
7. de Waal FBM, Bonnie KE (2009) In Tune with Others: The Social Side of
Primate Culture. In: Laland KN, Galef BG, Jr., eds. The Question of Animal
Culture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp 19–39.
8. Whiten A, McGuigan N, Marshall-Pescini S, Hopper LM (2009) Emulation,
Imitation, Over-Imitation and the Scope of Culture for Child and Chimpanzee.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B Biological Sciences
364: 2417–2428.
9. Tomasello M (1996) Do Apes Ape? In: Heyes CM, Galef BG, Jr., eds. Social
Learning in Animals: The Roots of Culture. San Diego, CA, USA: Academic
Press. pp 319–346.
10. Call J, Carpenter M (2002) Three Sources of Information in Social Learning. In:
Dautenhahn K, Nehaniv CL, eds. Imitation in Animals and Artifacts.
Cambridge, MA, US: The MIT Press. pp 211–228.
11. Carpenter M, Call J (2002) The Chemistry of Social Learning. Developmental
Science 5: 22–24.
12. Tennie C, Call J, Tomasello M (2006) Push or Pull: Imitation vs. Emulation in
Great Apes and Human Children. Ethology 112: 1159–1169.
13. Tomasello M (1990) Cultural Transmission in the Tool Use and Communica-
tory Signaling of Chimpanzees? In: Parker ST, Gibson KR, eds. ‘‘anguage’’and
Intelligence in Monkeys and Apes: Comparative Developmental Perspectives.
New York, NY, US: Cambridge University Press. pp 274–311.
14. Whiten A, Horner V, Litchfield CA, Marshall-Pescini S (2004) How Do Apes
Ape? Learning & Behavior 32: 36–52.
15. Custance DM, Whiten A, Fredman T (1999) Social Learning of an Artificial
Fruit Task in Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella). Journal of Comparative
Psychology 113: 13–23.
16. Huang C-T, Charman T (2005) Gradations of Emulation Learning in Infants’
Imitation of Actions on Objects. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 92:
276–302.
17. Call J, Carpenter M, Tomasello M (2005) Copying Results and Copying Actions
in the Process of Social Learning: Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and Human
Children (Homo sapiens). Animal Cognition 8: 151–163.
18. Whiten A, Ham R (1992) On the Nature and Evolution of Imitation in the
Animal Kingdom Reappraisal of a Century of Research. Advances in the Study
of Behavior 21: 239–283.
19. Gergely G, Csibra G (2006) Sylvia’s Recipe: The Role of Imitation and
Pedagogy in the Transmission of Cultural Knowledge. In: Enfield NJ,
Levenson SC, eds. Roots of Human Sociality: Culture, Cognition, and Human
Interaction. Oxford: Berg Publishers. pp 229–255.
20. Horne PJ, Erjavec M, Lovett VE (2009) The Effects of Modelling, Local
Stimulus Enhancement, and Affordance Demonstration on the Production of
Object-Directed Actions in 6-Month-Old Infants. British Journal of Develop-
mental Psychology 27: 269–281.
21. Whiten A, Horner V, de Waal FBM (2005) Conformity to Cultural Norms of
Tool Use in Chimpanzees. Nature 437: 737–740.
22. Zentall TR (2004) Action Imitation in Birds. Learning & Behavior 32: 15–23.
23. Tennie C, Tempelmann S, Glabsch E, Bra ¨uer J, Kaminski J, et al. (2009) Dogs
(Canis familiaris) Fail to Copy Intransitive Actions in Third Party Contextual
Imitation Tasks. Animal Behaviour 77: 1491–1499.
24. Voelkl B, Huber L (2007) Imitation as Faithful Copying of a Novel Technique in
Marmoset Monkeys. PLoS ONE 2: e611.
25. Whiten A, Custance DM, Go ´mez J-C, Teixidor P, Bard KA (1996) Imitative
Learning of Artificial Fruit Processing in Children (Homo sapiens)a n d
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology 110: 3–14.
26. Whiten A (1998) Imitation of the Sequential Structure of Actions by
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology 112: 270–281.
27. Stoinski TS, Wrate JL, Ure N, Whiten A (2001) Imitative Learning by Captive
Western Lowland Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) in a Simulated Food-Processing
Task. Journal of Comparative Psychology 115: 272–281.
28. Bonnie KE, Horner V, Whiten A, de Waal FBM (2007) Spread of Arbitrary
Conventions Among Chimpanzees: A Controlled Experiment. Proceedings of
the Royal Society of London B Biological Sciences 274: 367–372.
29. Hopper LM, Lambeth SP, Schapiro SJ, Whiten A (2008) Observational
Learning in Chimpanzees and Children Studied Through ‘Ghost’ Conditions.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B Biological Sciences 275: 835–840.
30. Tomasello M, Call J, Warren J, Frost GT, Carpenter M, et al. (1997) The
Ontogeny of Chimpanzee Gestural Signals: A Comparison Across Groups and
Generations. Evolution of Communication 1: 223–253.
31. Hopper LM, Spiteri A, Lambeth SP, Schapiro SJ, Horner V, et al. (2007)
Experimental Studies of Traditions and Underlying Transmission Processes in
Chimpanzees. Animal Behaviour 73: 1021–1032.
32. Call J, Hare B, Carpenter M, Tomasello M (2004) ‘nwilling’Versus ‘nable’
Chimpanzees’ Understanding of Human Intentional Action. Developmental
Science 7: 488–498.
33. Call J (2005) Chimpanzees Are Sensitive to Some of the Psychological States of
Others. Interaction Studies 6: 413–427.
34. Dindo M, Whiten A, de Waal FBM (2009) Social Facilitation of Exploratory
Foraging Behavior in Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella). American Journal of
Primatology 71: 419–426.
35. Mendes N, Hanus D, Call J (2007) Raising the Level: Orangutans Use Water as
a Tool. Biology Letters 3: 453–455.
36. Hanus D, Mendes N, Tennie C, Call J Comparing the Performance of Apes and
Humans in the Floating Peanut Task. submitted.
37. Whiten A, Goodall J, McGrew WC, Nishida T, Reynolds V, et al. (1999)
Cultures in Chimpanzees. Nature 399: 682–685.
38. Faraway JJ Extending the Linear Model with R: Generalized Linear, Mixed
Effects and Nonparametric Regression Models: CRC Press. 312 p.
39. Bates D, Maechler M, Dai B (2008) lme4: Linear Mixed-Effects Models Using
S4 Classes. R Package Version 0.999375-28.
40. R Development Core Team (2008) R: A Language and Environment for
Statistical Computing. Vienna, Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
41. Pinheiro JC, Bates DM (2000) Mixed Effect Models in S and Splus. New York,
NY: Springer.
42. Tennie C, Hedwig D, Call J, Tomasello M (2008) An Experimental Study of
Nettle Feeding in Captive Gorillas. American Journal of Primatology 70:
584–593.
43. Tennie C, Hedwig D (2010) How Latent Solution Experiments Can Help to
Study Differences Between Human Culture and Primate Traditions. In:
Potocki E, Krasin ´ski J, eds. Primatology: Theories, Methods and Research.
New York: Nova Publishers. pp 95–112.
44. Dindo M, Thierry B, Whiten A (2008) Social Diffusion of Novel Foraging
Methods in Brown Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus Apella). Proceedings of the Royal
Society of London B Biological Sciences 275: 187–193.
45. Huber L, Rechberger S, Taborsky M (2001) Social Learning Affects Object
Exploration and Manipulation in Keas, Nestor notabilis. Animal Behaviour 62:
945–954.
46. Spence KW (1937) Experimental Studies of Learning and the Higher Mental
Processes in Infrahuman Primates. Psychological Bulletin 34: 806–850.
47. Thorpe WH (1963) Learning and Instinct in Animals. London: Methuen.
48. de Waal FBM The Ape and the Sushi Master: Cultural Reflections
by a Primatologist. New York: Basic Books. pp 448.
49. Marshall-Pescini S, Whiten A (2008) Social Learning of Nut-Cracking Behavior
in East African Sanctuary-Living Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii).
Journal of Comparative Psychology 122: 186–194.
50. Huffman MA, Hirata S (2004) An Experimental Study of Leaf Swallowing in
Captive Chimpanzees: Insights Into the Origin of a Self-Medicative Behavior
and the Role of Social Learning. Primates 45: 113–118.
51. Lonsdorf EV, Ross SR, Linick SA, Milstein MS, Melber TN (2009) An
Experimental, Comparative Investigation of Tool Use in Chimpanzees and
Gorillas. Animal Behaviour 77: 1119–1126.
52. Visalberghi E (1987) Acquisition of Nut-Cracking Behaviour by 2 Capuchin
Monkeys (Cebus apella). Folia Primatologica 49: 168–181.
53. Tomasello M, Davis-Dasilva M, Camak L, Bard KA (1987) Observational
Learning of Tool-Use by Young Chimpanzees. Human Evolution 2: 175–183.
Emulation in Chimpanzees
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 May 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 5 | e10544